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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD L. STEADMAN and 
DONNA B. STEADMAN, 
his wife, and 
NORMA E. STEADMAN, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
LAKE HILLS, a corporation, and 
M. M. MERRILL, and LESTER M. 
JOHNSON and JOHNSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., 




APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Because Respondents' brief is replete with mis-
statements of fact and citations of authorities in 
support of propositions of law which they in fact 
do not support, appellants deem it necessary to file 
this reply to the assertions made by Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants reaffirm their statement of facts in 
their original brief and make the following clarifi-
cations of assertions made in Respondents' statement 
of facts: 
On page 2 of Respondents' brief it is asserted 
that the note was "directly incorporated into the 
mortgage" and that "the mortgage provided that 
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'in case of default in payment of this note, we agl'ee 
to pay all costs of collection, including a i·easonable 
attorney's fee' ". The truth is that the mortgage 
merely recited the terms of the note without making 
them a part of the terms agreed to in the mortgage 
and therefore the provision of the note referring to 
attorney's fees is not one of the mortgage obligations. 
(R.5). 
On page 3 of Respondents' brief it is stated that 
appellants had failed to pay taxes on the property 
for the years 1955 through 1961 and the property had 
been the subject of a tax sale. The truth is that the 
taxes for 1955 through 1957 had been abated by 
Salt Lake County (R. 70), the taxes for 1958 through 
1960 were the subject of abatement proceedings in 
process when Respondents' suit was commenced (R. 
17-18), and were eventually paid under protest, 
( R. 7 0), the taxes for 1961 were not yet due, and 
the record does not indicate that the property had 
been subject to a tax sale. 
On page 4 of Respondents' brief it is stated that 
"by virtue of the foreclosure, the Respondents were 
effectively protected, their mortgage interest was 
rendered more secure." The truth is that there was 
no foreclosure and Respondents needed no protection 
since there was no default and all installments were 
paid to and received by Respondents (R. 71-72). 
Also on page 4 of Respondents' brief it is stated 
that Respondents' amended and supplemental com-
plaint alleged that Lake Hills' successor-in-interest 
had agreed to pay Respondents' attorney's fees. The 
3 
truth is that no such allegation appears in the 
amended and supplemental complaint ( R. 50-51), 
and no such agreement was ever made by the suc-
cessor-in-interest. 
On pages 4 and 5 of Respondents' brief it is 
asserted that it was uncontroverted that Respond-
ents' counsel had spent 192 hours on the prosecution 
of the foreclosure action. The truth is that part 
of those 192 hours was spent after trial in numerous 
other matters and in researching and briefing issues 
not involved in this case (R. 109, 114-15). 
On page 5 of Respondents' brief it is stated that 
the Order Nunc Pro Tune was entered pursuant to 
a conversation had with counsel for both parties. 
The fact is that this statement is not supported by 
the record and the record indicates that the motion 




THE RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO ATTOR-
NEY'S FEES DEPENDS BOTH ON THE TERMS 
OF THE MORTGAGE AGREEMENT AND ON 
THE OUTCOME OF THE LITIGATION. 
There is no disagreement between Appellants 
and Respondents that attorney's fees are not allow- • 
able on a mortgage foreclosure unless specifically 
provided in the mortgage agreement. However, it is 
surprising to Appellants that Respondents would 
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claim that the right to attorney's fees does not de-
pend on the outcome of the litigation. In this case 
the mortgage agreement makes the attorney's fees 
depend on the outcome by using the words "in the 
event of foreclosure." Moreover, even if the mortgage 
provided for attorney's fees upon the institution of 
an action, it is inconceivable that a court would 
award attorney's fees just because an action had 
been instituted. Surely a mortgagee is not entitled to 
attorney's fees for filing an action that he is not 
justified in filing. If he were so entitled, he could in-
cur attorney's fees and charge them to his mortgagor 
merely by filing a complaint when no delinquency 
exists! The right to foreclose the mortgage, as deter-
mined by the outcome of the litigation, quite obvious-
ly has significant bearing on the right to attorney's 
fees. 
The right to foreclose the mortgage was decided 
against Respondents' by the lower court's 1961 rul-
ing of "no cause for action." However, the points 
disputing this raised by Respondents' brief will be 
dealt with in the order raised therein. 
(a) Appellants were not in default under the 
terms of the mortgage agreement nor would this be 
grounds for awarding attorney's fees. 
As pointed out on pages 8-9 and 10 of Appel-
lants' brief there was no default since the 1961 in-
stallment was paid within the thirty-day grace 
period provided in the escrow agreement and failure 
to pay taxes was not grounds for foreclosure under 
the terms of the mortgage. 
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Respondents' claim that the escrow agreement 
was subsequent to the mortgage and that they were 
completely separate and independent agreements 
each having no effect on the other is not supported 
by the facts nor the law. Their own Amended and 
Supplemental Complaint ( R. 50) alleges that the 
escrow agreement was entered "at the time of the 
execution and delivery of the mortgage" and that the 
mortgage was executed and delivered "by the terms" 
of the escrow agreement. Such a situation requires 
that all the documents be read together to determine 
the intent of the parties. Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 
Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 ( 1965) ; Strike v. Floor, 
97 Utah 265, 92 P.2d 867 (1939); 17 AM JUR. 
2d Con tracts § 264 ( 1964). Moreover, the practice 
of paying and receiving all installments through the 
escrow agent both before and after the action was 
commenced indicates an intent to be bound by the 
terms of the escrow agreement. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 
Utah 2d 205, 381P.2d86, 91 (1963); Hardinge Co. 
v. Eimco Corp., 1Utah2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954); 
17 AM JuR. 2d Contracts § 274 (1964). Further-
more, any right to receive the annual installments by 
April 15, the due date provided in the mortgage, was 
waived by Respondents' acceptance of every install-
ment prior to 1961 after April 15(R. 24). McBride 
v. Stewart, 68 Utah 12, 249 Pac. 114, 116 ( 1926). 
Even without such a waiver, payment after April 15 
is not grounds for forfeiture in the absence of a 
clause making time of the essence. Brixen v. Jorgen-
sen, 28 Utah 290, 78 Pac. 674 (1904); Bisno v. Sax, 
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175 Cal. App. 714, 346 P.2d 814 ( 1960). There is 
no such clause in the mortgage here involved. 
On page 8 of Respondents' brief two cases are 
cited as holding that "subsequent documents affect 
the terms of a prior mortgage agreement only where 
they clearly purport so to do, or are incorporated 
therein by reference." The first case cited, Knight v. 
Kitchen, 237 App. Div. 506, 261 N.Y. Supp. 809 
( 1933), in fact holds that a subsequent mortgage 
changed the terms of a prior agreement without 
purporting to do so or incorporating or referring 
to the prior agreement. The other case, Patterson v. 
Taylor, 15 Fla. 336 (1875), holds that a prior 
agreement cannot vary the express terms of a later 
mortgage. These authorities cited by Respondents 
support Appellants' position and would make the 
terms of the escrow agreement superior to any con-
tradictory terms in the mortgage. 
Respondents have attempted to make the terms 
of the note part of the obligations under the mort-
gage. Three comments on this attempt appear neces-
sary. First, as already explained there was no 
default in the payment of the note that would acti-
vate the provision for attorney's fees. Second, if there 
was a default, no further action was required after 
the 1961 installment was paid on May 12, 1961 and 
attorney's fees would be minimal. Third, the terms 
of the note were merely ref erred to in the mortgage 
as the object of the mortgage security. They were not 
agreed to as part of the obligations of the mortgage. 
The result of this distinction is that any attorney's 
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fees that might be due under the terms of the note 
alone are not a lien against the real property involved 
and must be collected, if at all, from the signers of 
the note. Appellants Johnson, as subsequent holders 
of the property, are bound only by the obligations 
of the mortgage and not by those of the note. 
(b) There has been no "foreclosure" in th'is 
case. 
It is agreed that the terms of the mortgage itself 
must govern the right to attorney's fees. Provisions 
granting a right to attorney's fees are to be strictly 
construed. Kinney v. Columbia Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, 113 Fed. 359 (D. Utah 1902). There is no 
right to attorney's fees under the mortgage here in-
volved except "in the event of foreclosure." As 
pointed out on pages 11-12 of Appellants' brief there 
was no foreclosure since there was no termination of 
the mortgagor's rights by decree, sale, or in any 
other manner. Respondents have sought to prove a 
foreclosure by citation of various authorities that 
should be examined more closely then Respondents 
have done. 
On page 10 of Respondents' brief the case of 
Insurance Co. of North America v. Cheathem, 299 
S.W. 545 (Ky. 1927), is misquoted as stating that 
foreclosure means the institution of suit to enforce 
a lien against property. This was not the holding 
of the court. The action was on a fire insurance 
policy which contained a clause voiding the policy if 
"foreclosure proceedings be commenced". The court 
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held the policy void because proceedings had been 
commenced though not completed. 
In support of Respondents' proposition that the 
"right to attorney's fees accrues at the commence-
ment of the foreclosure action and not at the end 
thereof" they have cited on pages 10-11 of their brief 
the following authorities: Equitable Life Assur. 
Soc'y of the United States v. Boothe, 160 Ore. 679, 
86 P.2d 960 (1939); Wienke v. Smith, 179 Cal. 220, 
176 Pac. 42 (1918); In re Peerless Weaving & 
Throwing Co., 259 Fed. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1919); Wat-
son v. Sawyer, 12 Wash. 35, 40 Pac. 413 (1895); 
Matter of Ebert, 140 F. Supp. 597 (D. Del. 1956); 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages§ 812b (1949); 1 JONES, MORT-
GAGES§ 442, at 567-68 (8th ed. 1928). Examination 
of each of these authorities reveals that every one of 
them involves a mortgage providing for attorney's 
fees in case of "default" or if "suit is brought". None 
of them, therefore, supports Respondents' position. 
Instead they all require strict adherence to the 
express terms of the mortgage. 
Then, on page 11 of Respondents' brief, another 
attempt is made to convince the court that foreclos-
ure is just the commencement of a proceeding by 
the age-old ruse of quoting out of context. So that no 
further question concerning this may be raised, the 
entire passage is set-out from 59 C.J.S. Mortgages 
§ 482, at761-62 (1949): 
The term "foreclosure" has been used 
with somewhat varying significance in and 
concerning statutes, as well as in common 
speech. In its natural and common usage, in 
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the law of mortgages, it means a termination 
of all rights of the mortgagor or of his grantee 
in the property covered by the mortgage ; the 
cutting off or depriving of the mortgagor of 
the right of redeeming the mortgaged estate, 
and is a remedy by which the property covered 
by the mortgage may be subjected to sale for 
the payment of the demand for which the 
mortgage stands as security. It denotes, not 
the beginning, but the end, of a procedure 
adopted by the mortgagee to bar perpetually 
the rights of the mortgagor, and includes the 
sale itself of the mortgaged property, rather 
than the steps preliminary to the sale. In its 
essential meaning, it imports definiteness in 
point of time as well as finality of consequence. 
. . . . the term "foreclosure" has itself 
acquired a modern significance, and it is now 
applied to any proceeding by which the mort-
gagor's equity of redemption in the property 
is cut off beyond possibility of recall. A pro-
cedure which results in the mortgagee even-
tually acquiring the mortgaged property clear 
of all claims of the mortgagor is a foreclosure. 
So, also, a proceeding terminating in a judicial 
sale of the mortgaged premises by which the 
mortgagor's rights are extinguished is a fore-
closure, as is a valid exercise of a power of 
sale conferred by the mortgage. In a nontech-
nical sense the term "foreclosure" may be ap-
plied to the enforcement of a mortgage by any 
form of legal proceeding. 
The terms of the mortgage require "the event of 
foreclosure" to occur before attorney's fees are due. 
Under the law there has been no foreclosure and 
under the facts there was no right to commence an 
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action. The lower court's award of attorney's fees 
to Respondents was therefore error. 
POINT IL 
THE ISSUES OF LACHES, ESTOPPEL AND 
HEARING BY A DIFFERENT JUDGE WERE 
ALL RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT. THE 
NUNC PRO TUNG ORDER COULD NOT AND 
NEED NOT BE OBJECTED TO BEFORE AP-
PEAL IS TAKEN THEREON. 
The record is clear that the issues of laches, 
estoppel and hearing by a different judge were all 
raised in the lower court. Reference to Appellants' 
Amendment to Reply ( R. 64-65) and Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact and for a New Trial, para-
graphs 1 (b), 1 ( c), 4 and 5 ( R. 79-81), reveals this 
to be the case. The lower court either overruled or 
refused to consider these points and they are there-
fore properly raised on appeal. 
The nunc pro tune order was obtained by Re-
spondents on ex parte motion and after trial. In 
fact it was obtained after the lower court had heard 
and denied Appellants' Motion to Amend Findings 
of Fact and for a New Trial. It was therefore too 
late to raise any objection to the order in the lower 
court. Moreover, it could only have been objected to 
by something in the nature of a motion to set the 
order aside or to amend the judgment which is not 
prerequisite to an appeal and would have been a 
useless gesture. 
11 
The cases cited by Respondents on page 12 of 
their brief relate to issues that were not considered 
or presented to the lower court. Each of the issues 
here was presented to the lower court. 
Respondents have asserted on page 12 of their 
brief that the issues of hearing before a different 
judge and that the judgment is not supported by 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were waived 
by Appellants for failure to designate them as points 
on appeal thereby prejudicing Respondents. This as-
sertion is without foundation or substance. Point 
three of Appellants Points Urged for Reversal (R. 
87) explicitely raises the first issue. Furthermore, 
there is no authority to indicate that failure to desig-
nate points on appeal is a waiver of them. Rule 
75 ( d)' UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, requires 
designation of points only when the whole record is 
not designated. The purpose of this is to allow the 
parties to designate the proper portions of the record. 
The only portions of the record necessary to deter-
mine whether the judgment is supported by findings 
and conclusions are the judgment and the findings 
and conclusions. Since both of these items are in the 
record on appeal ( R. 7 5-78) , there is no possible 
prejudice to Respondents and the issue may properly 
be considered by the court. 
POINT III. 
BY THEIR DELAY IN ASSERTING A 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES RESPOND-
ENTS HAVE FORFEITED THAT CLAIM UN-
DER THE LAW OF WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND 
LA CHES. 
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In Point III of their brief Respondents have ap-
parently misunderstood Point II of Appellants' brief. 
Respondents misrepresent Appellants' position as 
the mere acceptance of past-due installments after 
commencement of the action is waiver of the right to 
attorney's fees. After citing cases to counter this 
position Respondents then state that "it can scarce-
ly be said that an acceptance of installments after 
trial constitutes any more reason for finding a waiv-
er than acceptance of installments before trial." 
Appellants' actual position is that the accept-
ance of future installments (not just past-due in-
stallments) for a period of four-and-one-half years 
without making a claim or demand for attorney's 
fees or giving a notice of any kind that attorney's 
fees were owing establishes waiver of any right to 
those attorney's fees. In addition the change of posi-
tion by Appellants Johnson in reliance on the facts 
presented to them establishes estoppel and laches. 
This position is fully explained and supported in 
Appellants' brief. 
Appellants are not relying only upon the accept-
ance of a past-due installment (which in fact was 
not past-due but had been paid before delinquency 
to the escrow agent from whom disbursal was re-
fused by Respondents until after the 1961 trial). 
Moreover, the cases cited on pages 13-14 of Re-
spondents' brief do not support their position. 
Uedelhofen v. Mason, 20 Ill. 465, 66 N.E. 364 
( 1903), held that attorney's fees were still due under 
a deed of trust foreclosed as a mortgage when a 
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tender of the whole amount due except attorney's 
fees was made after the decree was entered, not be-
fore the decree as implied by Respondents. 
Harris v. Whittier Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 18 Cal. 
App. 2d 260, 63 P.2d 840 ( 1936), says nothing about 
attorney's fees and holds that the acceptance of part 
of the past-due amounts under a deed of trust is 
not a waiver of the right to declare default as to 
the remaining past-due amounts. 
Bisno v. Sax, 175 Cal. App. 2d 712, 346 P.2d 
814 (1960), also says nothing about attorney's fees 
as claimed by Respondents and in fact holds that 
the payment of past-due installments after institu-
tion of foreclosure proceedings cures the default and 
reinstates the deed of trust even though acclera-
tion of payments had been declared. 
Sellman v. Crosby, 20 Cal. App. 2d 562, 67 P.2d 
706 (1937), like the Harris case declares that the ac-
ceptance or tender of part of the past-due amounts 
is not a waiver of the rights under the acceleration 
clause as to the remaining past-due amounts. The 
court then implies that it would consider it a waiver 
if all past-due installments had been paid and ac-
cepted, which would conform to its later holding 
in Bisno v. Sax, above. 
All of these cases ref er to past-due installments, 
not future installments, and none of them supports 
Respondents' position. If anything, they support 
the position of Appellants. 
Appellants quite agree with Respondents' asser-
tion on page 15 of their brief that no question of 
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entitlement to attorney's fees arose until 1966. Any 
supposed right to attorney's fees accrued during the 
proceedings in 1961. The failure of Respondents to 
assert that right then and during the next four-and-
one-half years, during which the Appellants Johnson 
entered the picture, precludes them from asserting 
it now. Waiver, estoppel and laches are clearly estab-
lished. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORIGINAL DECI-
SION OF "NO CAUSE FOR ACTION" WAS A 
JUDGMENT RENDERING THE ISSUE OF AT-
TORNEY'S FEES RES JUDI CAT A. 
Appellants admit that under the decisions of 
this court a minute entry is ordinarily not a final 
judgment. However, the cases cited by Respondents 
on pages 15-16 of their brief are easily distinguished 
from the instant case. This is not a situation where 
the Appellants merely neglected to have a written 
judgment signed and entered before an appeal was 
taken. Rather, several attempts were made to have 
findings of facts and conclusions of law signed by 
the trial judge so that a final judgment could be 
entered. But because the trial judge failed to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required 
by Rule 52 (a), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
and placed on Appellants the burden of getting Re-
spondents to agree to findings and conclusions, no 
written judgment was signed and entered. And be-
cause Appellants and all others who might be inter-
ested were allowed by Respondents to rely on the 
I . 
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minute entry of "no cause for action" for four-and-
one-half years, the Appellants should not be deprived 
of their right to an effective and final judgment 
after a trial on the disputed issues. In such a case 
equity demands that the decision of "no cause for 
action" be res judicata. 
It is significant that Respondents did not at-
tempt to have the lower court overturn the ruling 
of "no cause for action" and proceed with the fore-
closure of the mortgage. They have in fact acquiesced 
in that ruling and then obtained an award of attor-
ney's fees which conflicts with and was disposed of 
by that ruling.To say, as Respondents have, that the 
ruling of "no cause for action" left the issue of attor-
ney's fees unresolved is to say once again that a 
mortgagee may penalize his mortgagor with attor-
ney's fees even though the mortgagor has complied 
with all terms of the mortgage. The issue was not 
mentioned in the minute entry because there was 
no evidence on the issue at the trial and because at-
torney's fees are not allowable unless a cause of 
action exists. 
Once again it is necessary to correct Respond-
ents' statement of the law. On page 16 of their brief 
it is stated that "res judicata applies only to those 
issues, both legal and factual, which have been clear-
ly disposed of on the face of the judgment." The Utah 
case cited for this proposition, Hartford Acc. & 
Idem. Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919 
( 1943), holds only that res judicata does not apply 
in the absence of a final judgment. The other case 
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cited, Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P.2d 390, 
392-93 (1942), actually had the following to say: 
While it is true that as a general rule a 
judgment is a bar as res judicata not only as 
to a subsequent action on the same matter 
actually determined but also as to all issues 
that might have been litigated as incident to 
or essentially connected with the subject mat-
ter of the litigation and every matter coming 
within its legitimate purview .... it is also 
true that that only is adjudged in a former 
judgment which appears upon its face to have 
been adjudged or which was actually and nec-
essarily included therein or necessary there-
to ... And when it affirmatively appears that 
an issue was not determined by the judgment, 
it obviously is not res judicata upon that issue. 
In that case the first judgment had expressly 
reserved the right of the plaintiff to determine his 
rights in a subsequent action. The court stated that 
this reservation was an improper splitting of causes 
of action but was nevertheless final and binding on 
the parties because the judgment had not been ap-
pealed. 
To apply that case to the facts of the case now 
before this court, if the lower court had actually 
reserved the issue of attorney's fees for later deter-
mination, it would have been error from which an 
appeal could be taken. The failure to expressly re-
serve the issue means that it was conclusively deter-
mined in the proceeding resulting in a judgment of 
"no cause for action". 
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Respondents' misplaced reliance on the cases 
cited in their brief aside, the law of res judicata in 
the State of Utah is as follows: A judgment rendered 
in a former action between the same parties or their 
privies, on the same cause of action, operates as a 
bar not only as to every matter raised and deter-
mined in the former action, but also as to every 
other matter which might have been raised or deter-
mined in that action. When the cause of action in the 
latter action is different, the former judgment bars 
only those matters actually raised and determined. 
National Fin. Co. v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 
P.2d 405 (1963); Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 
45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962); East Mill Creek Water Co. 
v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863, 866 
(1945); Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86 
Utah 340, 16 P.2d 1097 (1932) adhered to on re-
hearing, 86 Utah 354, 44 P.2d 698 (1935). This law 
clearly makes the original judgment rendered in the 
instant case res judicata as to the matter of attor-
ney's fees. 
Respondents' reliance on Rule 54 (b), UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, is also misplaced. Again 
quoting out of context Respondents omitted the first 
portion of the rule which provides that it applied 
only "when more than one claim for relief is pre-
sented in an action." Even if it could be said that 
there was more than one claim for relief presented 
in this action, the demand for attoney's fees was not 
one of them. Moreover, the judgment of "no cause 
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for action" adjudicated all claims in the action and 
therefore Rule 54 (b) does not apply. 
The allegation of Respondents that the original 
trial judge was confronted by counsel for both par-
ties and entered the order nunc pro tune with the 
consent of both parties is not supported by the rec-
ord. The order itself shows that it was obtained 
ex parte. ( R. 82) Furthermore, it is extremely doubt-
ful that the original trial judge would even remem-
ber the case let alone whether or not he meant to 
reserve the issue of attorney's fees five years earlier. 
POINT V. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE 
LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
Respondents' attempt to reconstruct their "Peti-
tion for Allowance of Attorney's Fees" into a "mo-
tion" so as to bring it within the terms of Rule 52 (a) 
making findings and conclusions unnecessary on 
motions needs little comment. 
The purpose of Rule 52 (a), which is also mis-
quoted by Respondents, is quite obviously to require 
the court to make findings of fact whenever factual 
issues are involved - whenever evidence, and in 
particular, oral testimony, is presented to the court 
as proof of facts - and to make findings unneces-
sary when a decision or judgment is rendered in 
response to a motion on issues of law when no facts 
are involved or in dispute. To say that findings were 
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not necessary in this case when Respondents found 
it necessary to present evidence to the court in the 
form of oral testimony, upon which the court was 
to base its decision, is to say that Rule ( 52 (a) is 
meaningless and that findings of fact are never 
necessary. Under Respondents' reasoning every trial 
could be brought before the court by a "petition" or 
"motion" for judgment and because it is brought up 
by a "motion", no findings of fact need be made 
from the evidence presented at the trial. 
Any judgment or order allowing attorney's fees 
to Respondents in this case necessarily depends upon 
the facts involved. Unless that judgment is supported 
by findings of fact and conclusions of law, it must 
be reversed. This contention is supported by the cases 
cited on page 27 of Appellants' brief which Respond-
ents have attempted to distinguish by claiming that 
they "either involve a 'judgment' based upon all of 
the pleadings and not merely upon a motion of one 
of the parties or are antedated by the Rules of Pro-
cedure." This attempt needs three comments. First, 
the distinction between a judgment on all the plead-
ings and a motion is not a viable one, as already ex-
plained. Second, the decision in F.M.A. Financial 
Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 
( 1965), was with respect to the issue of attorney's 
fees alone and not on all of the pleadings. Third, Re-
spondents undoubtedly meant "postdated" rather 
than "antedated" but similar provisions are never-
theless found in the prior code and three of the four 
cases cited by Appellants were decided subsequent 
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to the effective date of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
POINT VI. 
THE AT T 0 RN E Y ' S FEE OF $3500.00 
AWARDED IN THIS CASE IS UNREASONABLE 
AND UNCONSCIONABLE. 
Respondents have asserted on page 21 of their 
brief that the amount in controversy in this case 
was in excess of $90,000.00. Their complaint al-
leged the amount due to be only $79,927.55. More-
over, there is no finding or conclusion anywhere in 
these proceedings that any amount was due and no 
judgment or decree was ever entered that any 
amount was due. As a matter of fact all payments 
on the note and mortgage were made to Respondents 
so no judgment or decree could have been entered as 
to the amount upon which attorney's fees should be 
based. 
As pointed out on page 10 of Appellants' brief 
the lower court awarded attorney's fees to Respond-
ents solely because it thought the mortgage could 
be foreclosed for failure to pay taxes of $2,167.99. 
This, then, is the only amount upon which the award 
of attorney's fees could be based. To award attorney's 
fees which amount to more than 160 percent of the 
sum in controversy is unreasonable and unconscion-
able. The fee recommended by the UT AH ST ATE BAR 
ADVISORY HANDBOOK ON OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND 
FEES, at 22 (1961) is $4 7 4.80 and therefore 
$3500.00 is unreasonable. 
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Respondents have cited cases on page 22 of their 
brief to show that attorney's fees from ten per cent 
to seventy per cent of the amount in question have 
been allowed as reasonable. It should be pointed out 
that Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply, 
17 Utah 2d 179, 407 P.2d 141 ( 1965), held that an 
attorney's fee of less than ten per cent of the amount 
of the judgment was not unreasonable; Jens en v. 
Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 Pac. 1036 (1915), 
held that it was error to award an attorney's fee of 
less than ten per cent of the amount of the judgment 
without a determination that it was a reasonable fee; 
Parkinson v. Amundson, 122 Utah 443, 250 P.2d 944 
(1952), upheld an attorney's fee of $250.00 on a 
judgment of $359.00 - indicating only that a higher 
percentage fee may be allowed on small judgments. 
None of these cases supports an attorney's fee 
amounting to 160 per cent of the amount in question 
and all of them are based on the amount of the judg-
ment entered in the case. In the case now before the 
court there is no judgment or decree either to justify 
or upon which to base an attorney's fee. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein and in Appellants' 
initial brief, Respondents are not entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees and Appellants respectfully 
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pray that this court grant the relief requested in 
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